Constructionism, Hermeneutics, and Phenomenology in Qualitative Psychotherapy Research – SEPI Lisbon Pre-Conference Discussion.

PART TWO

Mike, 18 June 2007 (2)

More comment in bold below!

(From Dan, June 14)

Hi Tullio and Mike,

I have found some time to think some more about SEPI presentation in light of your abstracts and what I have learned so far from our very interesting and informative email discussion.

Tullio, I see the goal of what you propose as the discovery/isolation-and-articulation -- through an open-minded, "phenomenological" observation of actual therapy processes -- of general therapy processes across theoretical orientations. I'm assuming the end result of this process is illustrated by the two "Pattern" figures you sent us in your full paper.

Mike, I would like to see a parallel concrete example illustrating the goal of what you are seeking in your DAPP system of analysis.

DAPP analysis can be used for addressing questions at varying levels of generality. The first level of use is to document what it is the unique development that occurs in any given case of psychotherapeutic treatment. While I claim that what all successful therapy has in common is that it leads to development, the specific developments/outcomes are unique for every case. I'm trying to navigate between the Scylla of "no common way to evaluate effectiveness of psychotherapy" and the Charybdis of "evaluate by recourse to common outcome measures", which result in missing much of what's important in therapy as well as what is unique and important in an individual treatment. Here, the product is a case analysis, and as soon as I am done with my book I will prepare one for your journal, if you'd like.

The next level of generality is in discovering, and highlighting parallel ways in which therapists' support clients' development across all modalities and approaches to psychotherapy. Here the distinction among Attentional Support, Interpretation, and Enactment, and the claim that all therapies "work" through some combination of these, is a product. I will try to provide you a summary of this distinction if you want, either before, during or after Lisbon. (I guess this is choosing the 2nd answer to your second question below). Beyond that, questions of how cases, therapists, and approaches systematically differ from one another can also be asked using DAPP coding, but not much of this has been done yet.

Quantitative data would be particularly useful in addressing this last set of questions. In most of what we've done, the only significant use of quantitative methods have been in the measurement of inter-rater reliability, which to me is simply a formalization of the hermeneutic telos of the expansion of intersubjectivity.

I hope that helps for now.

For example,

1) Do you use quantitative analysis along with qualitative analysis in your coding? and

2) Do you search for generalizations at the level of Tullio, or do you search for patterns of common processes as they are embodied in particular cases?

In my own pragmatic psychology model, my goal is to create a database of published therapy case studies that are systematic and methodologically rigorous, and that generally (although not necessarily) follow Peterson's Disciplined Inquiry model in their overall structure, to facilitate cross-case comparisons. In my model, the way to generalization is inductive, from groups of case studies using similar approaches with similar clients. Examples of what I am seeking are the published case studies on the PCSP web site (http://pcsp.libraries.rutgers.edu). E.g., see Vol. 1, Module 3 for a psychodynamic case, and Vol. 3, Module 2, for a cognitive-behavioral case. I'll try to review these. My model is trans-theoretical, in that it accommodates multiple theoretical orientations; however, it simply requires the practitioner to systematically set out whatever theoretical model he or she was using, not to focus on common processes per se. I think, in contrast, we look first at the dynamics/common developmental and relational process that occur across theoretical models, and then look to the practitioners theoretical model to understand the choices s/he made that fostered those processes. I think this is one way in which our approaches are quite different? Do both you, Dan, and you, Tullio, agree?

The first level of generalization, as I mentioned above, is within a particular theoretical model dealing with a particular type of client. However, at a later stage, these "first-;evel" generalizations could be inductively analyzed for generalizations about common processes across multiple theoretical orientations. In any event, a crucial aspect of any generalization in pragmatic psychology is that since the generalizations emerge inductively from specific cases, the generalizations are embodied/grounded in those cases. The logic of the system always allows the reader to trace back from the generalization to the specific cases and case examples that created these generalizations. This, I would say is also true of the DAPP approach.

I believe that the similarities and differences among our approaches is clarified and concretized by laying out the specific "products" that each of us are trying to create. At this point, it sees to me that Tullio and I are rather different, in that I am focusing more on collecting concrete, contextualized, thickly described case study examples, while Tullio is looking to go much more directly to identifying broad, general processes/patterns. I'll be giving a presentation the Saturday of the conference (the day before our session), in which I will present some analyzed case material, which is the type of product that is like Dan's, and the description of the dialectics of attentional support, interpretation, and enactment, which is an effort, like Tullio, to identify broad general processes.

Mike, 26 June 2007

Having read your most recent posts, most notably where Tullio writes:

I have no problem in admitting that we construct in our mind the images of things, to the extent that my constructions mirror what is out there, the ontological reference. Yet constructionism, as I understand it, denies the mirroring capacity of the mind (Dan does it explicitly, do you deny it too, Mike?). Construction is a basic and obvious activity of our perceptive apparatus, constructionism (as I see it) is a theoretical position that gives subjective (individual or cultural) construction a privileged status, to the detriment of the possibility of objective knowledge. Do I see it correctly?

Maybe a way out of this conundrum is in Habermas' conception of "human interests" that are constitutive of knowledge and that go beyond the "interests" of particular individuals or communities. I don't know what precisely Habermas means by human interests. But if they are to go beyond the interests of particular individuals or communities, it means that the human being has the capacity to transcend all particular interests, or to suspend or bracket them off: this is exactly the function of the transcendental ego in phenomenology. You may not like the word 'phenomenology', but it seems to me that either you admit that the human being has the capacity to go beyond or transcend all particular interests, or you don't. What remains of 'constructionism', if you do?

In response to this last question, I personally would say: I reject your either/or!! I don't think the (individual ) human being has the capacity, but humans collectively engaged and committed to the construction of "knowledge" do.

Anyway, taking this as a jumping off point, let's start by seeing if I understand our respective epistemological positions.

I see myself as a dialectical-constructivist. Whereas "individual constructivism" (a la Kelly), or "social constructionism" a la Gergen, do tend to lead to relativism, because my version of dialectical constructivism sees changing human communities as interacting with each other and with changing material reality over time, it envisions a process (of which Habermas states the presumptions) in which knowledge can evolve in the direction of universality (at least temporary universality -- further disequilibrium can emerge). But this is through construction and interaction, not thru the "mirroring" which seems important in Tullio's epistemology. Now Dan, Tullio seems to view you as a relativistic constructionist. Would you agree with that? If so, I think our three epistemological perspectives may present interesting contrasts for an audience interested in qualitative research. We also each have described our own psychotherapy qualitative research "projects", which all seem to me to be very valuable and worthwhile regardless of one's epistemological perspective.

So we have differences to present at the level of epistemology and differences at the level of research method for studying psychotherapy. I asked myself what connects these two levels? The answer that I came up with is that different epistemological positions lead to different assumptions about how research-generated knowledge is "validated." The empiricists who reject qualitative research do so because they claim we are "fuzzy", and don't have the kind of rigorous validation processes that they do. So I'm wondering if we can collectively respond by making sure to include in our talks discussion about the implication of our epistemological positions for how we would understand the knowledge about psychotherapy generated by our various forms of research to be validated (or not). (Habermas describes the validation of hermeneutic knowledge in what I see as quite rigorous terms which I'd be glad to offer).

Anyway, what do you guys think of this idea -- make sure that each of our presentations distinguish three levels--1) Projects involving qualitative research on psychotherapy, 2)epistemological assumptions, and 3)the implications of our assumptions for how we understand that the knowledge produced by our projects(and others) should be received, validated, responded to , confirmed, disconfirmed, whatever?

I think this could make for a really exciting panel (and discussion among the three of us). I look forward to hearing your thoughts.

There is one more line of comment that I would like to add here about your previous post, Tullio.

I couldn’t help but smile when I read your fascinating phenomenological reinterpretation of Piaget! You wrote:

The dialectic of interpretation and neutralization has been described, albeit in different words (assimilation and accommodation), by Piaget. In the course of normal development the child firstly tries to assimilate all new data to her available cognitive schemata, ie she interprets them in the light of preexisting models, myths or theories. Piagetian assimilation substantially corresponds to hermeneutic interpretance, an ongoing, structural attitude of the human being. However, the healthy child does more than assimilation. Facing contradiction, she does not insist on trying to force reality into her schemata, but she finally suspends those schemata, stepping back and letting the new data enter into her horizon.In so doing, the child does not interpret, but sees something new, thanks to the suspension of the assimilative attitude.

My first response to this was that your “healthy child” has to not only be healthy but precocious. She has to have read Husserl and Heidegger, in fact! I think Piaget would view the child as accommodating schemata to equilibrate the novelty noticed through assimilation using the schemata, with both processes happening simultaneously. I don’t think most children experience themselves as "suspending" their assumptions, their “assimilative attitude” or as " stepping back". They experience themselves as extending and modifying their schemata in vivo when they learn. I assume clinical interviews with children might shed light on how plausible your reinterpretation is – would you agree?

You go on: Instead of assimilating the data to her schemata, she accommodates her perceptive apparatus to the reality in front of her. The child's accommodation is the first embryo of phenomenology's epoché, in which the bracketing of expectations and preconceptions permits her to receive what appears in that opening. And it is only for this systematic neutralization that her schemata are modified and enriched.

Again, Piaget and most constructivists see assimilation and accommodation as occurring simultaneously. The contrast to the “healthy child” is the dogmatist-- a child (or scientist or community) who clings rigidly to her/his/their structures and fails to accommodate in the face of new data. But if you view what healthy children and healthy scientists and healthy communities do naturally when we learn as the “embryo of phenomenology’s epoche”, maybe I can offer a constructivist reinterpretation of phenomenology, where being open to accommodating new data as we assimilate it, in contrast to rigidly maintaining our structures dogmatically, is what all this “bracketing” and “suspending” stuff is about. I surely would agree that what’s going on in the world outside of me is as responsible for my accommodation, growth and change as I am, or the interlocutors I engage to help me make sense. Does this allow for a synthesis of our perspectives? With enough reinterpretation, maybe we can all be “dialectical-constructivist-phenomenologists!”

Dan, 26 June 2007

Hi Mike and Tullio,

Mike wrote: "Now Dan, Tullio seems to view you as a relativistic constructionist. Would you agree with that?" No, I have labelled my constructionist position, following Rorty, as "pragmatic relativism," which sounds very similar to, in Mike's words, "Habermas' conception of "human interests" that are constitutive of knowledge and that go beyond the "interests" of particular individuals or communities." My description of pragmatic relativism is below. As you can see, it goes beyond the individual's personal, subjective view of "the real" and "the good," and refers rather to the historically evolved values and truths and problem-solving strategies of social and cultural groups that have evolved in mutual, intersubjectively involved dialogue over time and over groups. This historical, social and cultural proving ground of those ideas and values that are most useful in our everyday lives is similar to Habermas' idea of "human interests" that go beyond the "the "interests" of particular individuals or communities."

Mike, you had earlier mentioned writing a case for the PCSP journal after you finish your book. That sounds great to me, and I very much look forward to it!

Finally, Mike has written:

This sounds like a good outline to me and I will follow it.

°°°°°°°°°°°°

I. “Anything-Goes” Relativism vs “Pragmatic” Relativism

1. Tullio writes: This leads to my second objection. You seem to endorse the currently prevailing view according to which any observation is theory-laden, and there cannot exist an observation endowed with some degree of theory freedom. This view seems bound to lead to theoretic-cultural relativism, since how can an observation insuperably conditioned by the theory of the observer work as judge on the validity of the theories of different observers?

2. Mike writes: On the core issue here, my view is that the cure to the problem of “every group having its own science”, and thus both psychotherapy practice and psychotherapy research being limited by the shared assumptions of various communities of discourse comprising researchers and or practitioners, is the expansion of intersubjectivity to the point of its becoming (ideally) fully inclusive, not objectivity. My views on epistemology, scientific methodologies, and their relationship to the human condition are built upon those of the philosopher Jurgen Habermas. . . . But with respect to this issue, it leads to (agreement with Tullio?) in the view that the acceptance of relativism as insurmountable is incompatible with the telos of science.

3. Both of you seem to imply the common view that relativism vs. objectivism is dichotomous, and that by relativism you mean what is sometimes called “anything goes” relativism. Below is a relevant quote from my reply to Held’s first article in the PCSP journal series in how I view relativism as a question of degree, and that “pragmatic relativism” provides a viable epistemological option to the agreed upon problems of anything-goes relativism.

One could claim that there is no way to settle disputes between those who religiously believe in an imminent rapture and those who don’t so believe, because each has true beliefs within their own knowledge system. Also, one could claim that within a toddler’s knowledge system, scribbling can equate with the beautiful; and that within a religiously motivated terrorist’s knowledge system, killing innocent individuals for symbolic, political purposes can be good. Yet this is only one view of the problem of relativism, the so-called position of “anything goes” relativism, which has been forcefully critiqued by such anti-objectivist and pragmatism-sympathetic authors as Richard Bernstein in his book, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism (1983), and Clifford Geertz (1989), in his chapter, “Anti Anti-Relativism.” As Held points out my own response to the potential epistemological problems that relativism raises is the position of “pragmatic relativism” first enumerated in the ideas of Bernstein (1983) and Rorty (1989). . . .

While stating that objective knowledge is not possible, pragmatic relativism avoids anything-goes relativism by pointing to the fact that many perspectives and conceptual frameworks are not arbitrary, trivial, or insubstantial. For these frameworks arise from and are embedded in historical traditions and contemporary sociocultural structures and institutions. And even though this does not endow such a framework with absolute authority or certainty [derived from knowledge that ontologically mirrors the world], it does provide the framework with significant momentum and weight in determining the present.

For example, in the industrialized countries of Western Europe, the United States, and Canada over the past 125 years, there have been very strong traditions of striving towards democracy and social justice that are a major moral force in the world today – traditions that can be traced at least back in part to situations and events such as Periclean Greece in the fifth-century B.C., the Magna Carta in 1215, and the Declaration of Independence in 1776. On the other hand, these traditions don’t carry objective or absolute moral authority outside of the historical and contemporary sociopolitical context of the last 125 years. The counterexamples of Nazi Germany and fascist Italy in the 1930s and ‘40s certainly illustrate this lack of absolute moral authority. However, the fact that these two regimes have mainly been the exception over the past 125 years reflects the very substantial force of the democratic and social justice tradition. (Fishman, 1999, p. 113)

4. Pragmatic relativism seems to me to be close to Mike’s idea of the “expansion of intersubjectivity” to the point of its becoming (ideally) fully inclusive, [but] not objectivity.” In both our views, the goal is, through democratic dialogue, to work towards growing agreement within a widening group of stakeholders as to what, for example, are the goals of therapy and how the degree of achievement of these goals can be measured in a rigorous and acceptable manner.

What pragmatists like Bernstein and Rorty argue is that we should continue the dialogue to air the complexities of an issue and to express our differences on it, and then to try to come to an informed consensus as to a workable common perspective for guiding our actions. In my view, this process does not have to lead to the discovery of a single “mountain” that represents the true picture of reality. Mike’s framing of it in terms of “the expansion of intersubjectivity” seems to me one of the goals of many in SEPI – not to expect to “discover” the single, true integrated theory, but rather to expand our mutual understanding of the varieties of integration (common factors, assimilative integration, theoretical integration, etc.), and the pros and cons of each -- and how this knowledge might pragmatically translate into improving the effectiveness of the therapy services that we offer.

Tullio, 28 June 2007

Hi Mike and Dan,

We seem to have at least a significant common ground in Habermas' conception of "human interests" -- although we might have different readings of such conception. Dan: it is not clear to me how you reconcile your pragmatic relativism with Habermas' human interests that transcend (go beyond) the interests of particular individuals or communities, given that your reference is to "the historically evolved values and truths and problem-solving strategies of social and cultural groups that have evolved in mutual, inter-subjectively involved dialogue over time and over groups." You explicitly refer to the "industrialized countries of Western Europe, the United States, and Canada over the past 125 years" . It seems to me that in a non Euro-centered or non West-centered perspective, these industrialized countries are "particular communities" like any other (whose interests, by the way, are strongly opposed by many outside and inside the Western world who do not share the Western values, or even are persuaded that the Western civilization has brought the world to the brim of self-destruction). Incidentally, it is much the same objection B. Held made to you. You rightly call "relativistic" your constructionism, whereas Habermas' human interests that go beyond the interests of particular individuals or communities seem to me to be the very opposite of any form of relativism.

Mike and Dan: your constructionisms look very similar from my standpoint, insofar as you both seem to overemphasize the subject to the detriment of the object, with the result that objectivity completely disappears from your horizons (where one finds at most inter-subjectivity). I can understand that as a (postmodern?) reaction to the opposite (modern) bias that cancels the subject, but a correct relation between subject and object cannot obtain, if one or the other is downplayed. In a correct (as I see it) dialectic, the quality of the object depends on the quality of the subject. The ordinary subject, motivated by particular interests, produces his idiosyncratic objects. The transcendental subject, motivated by transcendental interests ( i.e., interests that go beyond particular interests, especially the interest for true knowledge in our context), produces transcendental objects (i.e., objects endowed with a certain degree of truth or objectivity).

At the level of the ordinary subject (individual or collective) the objects are so much the product of their particular, subjective interests, that there is no place for objectivity here. The only remedy to such state of affair is a negotiation (I would not speak of true dialogue at this level) between conflicting interests, conducive to inter-subjective objects that surely embody a higher degree of truth than merely subjective objects. It seems to me that your constructionisms correctly describe the state of affairs on this level. But the transcendental subject is capable of producing objective knowledge, and s/he does so even at the individual level, contrary to what Mike seems to believe: " I don't think the (individual ) human being has the capacity, but humans collectively engaged and committed to the construction of 'knowledge' do."

Let me make an example. If I have to cross a street where there is no trafic light, I look in both directions to be sure that there is no car arriving that could run me down. My survival depends on my capacity of assessing with a good enough degree of objectivity the speed of the cars arriving form both directions. It is not that I engage in a dialogue with passers-by in order to construct a reliable knowledge of the speed of the vehicles. My inbuilt capacity for objective knowledge is enough (coupled in this case with the pragmatic interest of crossing the street, but perfectly working as a standalone function). If I had to depend on dialogue or negotiation when I have to cross the street, or in the numberless everyday occasions in which I need to know how things really are in the real world, my case would be hopeless. This is not to say that I want to undervalue dialogue -- on the contrary, I share your conviction of its essential function. But true dialogue happens, in my view, only to the extent that the persons engaged in it suspend, bracket off, or put at stake their particular convictions. Thanks to this suspension, the logos (the logic, the truth) of the discourse can show itself in the space opened between (dià) the persons in dialogue. Without such suspension, what happens is to me not real dialogue, but just negotiation. On the other hand, this suspension is the same operation that permits a certain degree of objectivity already at the individual level.

Now, in reply to Mike's effort to define our respective epistemologies, I would say that objective knowledge is crucial in mine, objectivity being the quality of knowledge produced by the transcendental subject, both individually and in dialogue. Objectivity is limited and imperfect, but it can be good enough as a knowledge of how things really are in the real world (not just for pragmatical reasons). Construction of mental schemes and interactions are necessary, but not sufficient. Objectivity, in fact, is a function of the capacity of, and the will to, free oneself of, or suspend, all mental schemes -- presuppositions, expectations and judgments -- for looking at the world with fresh eyes, and for entering dialogue with an open mind. When the crucial importance of the transcendental subject is underestimated, or not perceived at all, other epistemic modes are overemphasized (e.g. hypothetico-deductive or probabilistic-inductive). These modes do work in their own right, but they work even better if the transcendental ego is in charge of the whole process. The transcendental function, however, has to be cultivated, as the phenomenologists know well (see the practice of epoché).

By contrast, you both don't believe in objectivity and specially in the capacity of the individual subject of being objective at least in a limited way; therefore you see in the corrective power of inter-subjective communication (Mike would add: “and novel experience/interaction with the world”) the only possibilities of pragmatically effective knowledge.

Dan and Mike, I am afraid that I have a little bit exasperated our differences, for the sake of clarity and of dialectical exchange. But I am sure that we shall still have many opportunities to focus on the things we share.

Mike, 28 June 2007

Tullio, Dan said that he was comfortable with my suggestion regarding organizing our discussions in terms of three levels: epistemological assumptions; research approaches; and understandings of how knowledge generated using such approaches is validated/built upon;

on which we each have a somewhat different perspective to offer. How do you feel about that idea?

Tullio, 29 June 2007

I feel very very good.

Mike, 30 June, 2007.

My final comment, in response to Dan’s of 26 June and Tullio’s of 28 June.

Regarding Dan’s comment, your citing Richard Bernstein augments my hope of finding common ground, as it was his writings that helped me understand Habermas’ incredibly dense text. Your focus on dealing with the current state of affairs in psychotherapy research, as opposed to the ultimate transcendental ideals of pursuing knowledge and truth, may help provide clarification of where our foci may be different and how my perspective may indeed be between yours and Tullio’s. Let my try to explain by taking off from the situation of “Tullio crossing the street” that he discussed.

Following Piaget, I would suggest that you, Tullio, don’t have inbuilt capacity for objective knowledge, independent of your experience interacting with the world of vehicles. (This is why we don’t trust toddlers to cross streets themselves). We learn all we learn through interaction between subjects and objects, and the schemes we develop all entail and embody this interaction. (i.e. cognitive structures are all ultimately action schemes and representations of actions and their results). Subject and object are all entirely intertwined within our knowledge and I think it folly to try to ever completely extricate one from the other. As to overcoming relativism, 1) knowers share the material space of the universe and therefore must ultimately coordinate their actions – the question is do they do it well (constructively) or poorly (destructively); 2) for anyone to pursue truth or knowledge presumes the possibility of a coordination of understanding in which biases are overcome – the questions involve how do we pursue this, as well as what I gather pragmatic relativism entails, how we interact in a world in which our biases have been recognized, but not yet overcome. And I agree with Tullio here, that the distinction between negotiation, which I see as appropriate to the latter situation, and true dialogue, which aims at overcoming bias, is extremely important. And I agree with Tullio’s conception of true dialogue as putting at stake convictions, (and at the individual level, back to the Piaget/phenomenololgy reinterpretations, in using schemata we do put them at stake). The key (perhaps illusory) distinction here seems to be between holding one’s convictions at a critically reflective distance and being willing to let them be challenged, vs. “suspension” of them.

Dan, 30 June 2007

(Tullio’s June 15 comments in italics, Dan's discussion in non-italics and bold)

Pragmatism

On June 15 Tullio wrote: Thank you Dan for the material on Rorty. I myself am a pragmatist, if it means a person to whom knowledge counts to the extent that it helps solve problems of, or give meaning to, everyday life, not that it looks for eternal truths.We are very much in agreement here!

But I certainly disagree with Rorty when he maintains that "truth is not out there, separate from our own beliefs and language" (from the NYT obituary, highlighted by you). The horse-ness is out there, thanks to it every child knows how to distinguish a horse from a donkey, independently of belief and language. Rorty and Wittgenstein would contend that this type of distinction is inextricably intertwined with language, and that thinking and concept formation cannot be detached from the interaction of language as it aids us in maneuvering in the world of action and lived experience. Human growth needs specific growth factors that are out there -- nothing to do with beliefs and language. But these can only be validated by acting upon the biological world in specific, pragmatic ways and by understanding what we do within language. We need some essential aminoacids, vitamins, minerals in our diet, however you call them and whatever you believe. There are also psychological factors that are essential, e.g. unconditional acceptance and confrontation. Psychological factors are more difficult to objectively tie down since they do not exist as concrete, 3-dimensional objects, which are much more amenable to sensorily mediated, intersubjective agreement. For example, “unconditional acceptance” is defined in different ways in different cultures. You can vary your diet, or the way you raise your children, in many ways, according to your tastes, preferences and beliefs. But you must introduce in your diet and your educational style (and your therapy) some essential, indispensable factors, if you don't want you and your sons (and your patients) to get (or remain) sick. These are not eternal truths, just essential truths inasmuch as they belong to the essence of the human species in the current phase of its evolution. Why not just say that these are pragmatically derived truths based upon past experience?

Induction

Tullio wrote: My approach is not inductive as yours. I rely mainly on processes of abstraction and identification of the inner logic of the different patterns. It is the same process applied in zoology or botany: you don't need many horses to describe the structure of the horse. Just a couple of exemplars will do.However, there are other situations in biology that strongly emphasize induction. For example, there are over 1 million species of insects, e.g., approximately 5,000 dragonfly species, 2,000 praying mantis, 20,000 grasshopper, 170,000 butterfly and moth, 120,000 fly, 82,000 true bug, 360,000 beetle, and 110,000 bee, wasp and ant species described to date. The botanists who have derived this knowledge of insects have proceeded in part inductively, with a vast variety of systematic, sense-based observations of actual insects in specific, local conditions. It might be that all 20,000 types of grasshoppers have similar structure in common, but they also have many differences among them. In a similar way, the Pragmatic Case Study Method proposes systematic, cross-case comparisons among many therapy case studies of a certain type to see what patterns of commonalities and differences emerge, and the implications of these patterns for improving therapy outcomes with similar types of patients in the future.

Truth

As a way of perhaps bridging between my theory of truth and Tullio’s, here is a quote, in italics below, from a recent article by Bill Stiles (“Numbers Can Be Enriching”, New Ideas in Psychology 24 (2006) 252–262, italics added). Stiles is integrating the concept of our knowledge corresponding to something in the world (and not just as embedded in language or individual subjective experience per se), but also the notion that this knowledge takes place through the critically reviewed experiences of interacting social group members as mediated by observational feedback from the world.

The critics of positivism react most strongly against the presumption of an absolute truth. . . . Yet there seems to be some intuitive sense in which a goal of empirical research is telling the truth about the real world. (Stiles, 1981). How can a semiotic and therefore unstable concept of meaning be reconciled with this goal?

It has helped clear my thinking in this realm to consider that truth is a property of statements, not a property of unstated experience or of the material world. Only statements can be true or false—not objects or events or even perceptions or intentions. With this understanding as a starting point, I hold an experiential correspondence theory of truth: a statement is true for you to the extent that your experience of the statement corresponds to your experience of the event (object, state of affairs) that it describes. Your experience is the common denominator (Stiles, 1981, 2003, 2005).

This theory does not completely solve the problem of how words can correspond to events, but it does reduce the epistemological problem to the classic psychological problem of stimulus equivalence. It does not permit absolute truth . . . for all of the reasons that make perception and communication inaccurate and variable. But on the other hand, it offers a route towards closer approximations to sharing experience of the world via systematic observation and careful description.

The experiential correspondence theory of truth puts a premium on accurate and precise communication. I may be communicating my experience honestly, but if I do a poor job of it, your experience will not correspond to mine very well, and it is therefore unlikely to correspond very well to the events I described.

In passing, I would like to comment on the concept of facts. What is the differente between a fact and any other statement based on an observation? Positivism might hold that a fact has an independent truth, but this is impossible from the perspective of the experiential correspondence theory. Instead, I suggest, facts are statements of people’s observations that happen to be socially shared or endorsed. This concept of fact, then, is a sort of social constructionism, but with an escape hatch: facts can be changed by observation. If someone observes something different and so disagrees (or, at least, if enough people observe something different), the statement is no longer a fact.

Summary

In summary, all three of us strongly believe in the scientific value of analyzing in detail the qualitative data that constitute a description of patients' lives, lived experiences, and the actual processes of therapy. In a parallel way, I believe all three of us agree on the scientific value of systematic and holistically oriented therapy case studies, with a focus on inductively discovering generalized knowledge that, in Tullio's words, [pragmatically] helps solve problems of, or give meaning to, everyday life, not that . . . looks for eternal truths. Where Mike and I differ from Tullio, I also believe, is that Mike and I, in the service of pragmatically helpful knowledge, are (a) more willing than Tullio to use quantitative data in addition to qualitative; and (b) in contrast to Tullio, are sympathetic to a constructionist view of the world that sees human truths not as objective aspects of the world that can be mirrored in an individual's experience, but rather -- in Stiles' sense -- as evidence-based perspectives on the world that reflect the shared experiences of groups of individuals through history and, in Mike's sense, as perspectives whose validity is strengthened by expanding intersubjectivity.

Tullio, 1 July 2007

Mike, you say (in your 26 June post) that “Piaget and most constructivists see assimilation and accommodation as occurring simultaneously”. What you say is right in a constructivist perspective, but not in a dialectical one. In a dialectical perspective the ordinary subject automatically tries to assimilate all new experiences to their old schemes (the ordinary subject basically works in an automatic, i.e. unaware and uncritical way). But then the ordinary subject (i.e., the subject that works basically in an assimilative way) comes across experiences that don’t fit well within their schemes (this is the antithetical moment). When this happens – and it happens all the time – two alternative lines are possible. On the first one, the subject succeeds in forcing the new data into the old schemes. It is what you call the “dogmatic” subject. In this case the dialectical movement of knowledge does not take place. On the second line, the transcendental subject wakes up, suspends the action of the old schemes and permits a fresh look at the world of experience, unconditioned by the old perceptive habits. In this case the dialectical movement of knowledge takes place, and leads to a new perception of things that accommodates the new experience. The new perception is a synthesis of the old and the new.

You say that my “healthy child has to not only be healthy but precocious. She has to have read Husserl and Heidegger, in fact!”. The healthy child does not need to read Husserl and Heidegger, we do need, because we mostly have lost the uncorrupted look of the child. We have learnt to see the world as our parents, teachers, priests, scientists, politicians, media want us to see it. But the healthy, uncorrupted child, still can see that the king is naked. We cannot any longer, therefore we need to read Husserl and Heidegger, in the hard work to regain the innocent look of the child – or, in other words, to reactivate the transcendental subject that upbringing has mostly turned off. Then you say: “maybe I can offer a constructivist reinterpretation of phenomenology, where being open to accommodating new data as we assimilate it, in contrast to rigidly maintaining our structures dogmatically, is what all this “bracketing” and “suspending” stuff is about. I surely would agree that what’s going on in the world outside of me is as responsible for my accommodation, growth and change as I am, or the interlocutors I engage to help me make sense. Does this allow for a synthesis of our perspectives? With enough reinterpretation, maybe we can all be “dialectical-constructivist-phenomenologists!”. Yes, I agree that your “openness to accommodating new data” is another way of saying what phenomenologists call bracketing or suspending. But, beyond the choice of the terms, what count to me is the substance. And the substance to me is that: first, the dialectical process that leads to a new synthesis through an antithetical experience can takes place very rapidly (in a child or in a wise man), but the steps of this process are not simultaneous, and above all not automatic; and second, the openness or suspension is a state in which one does not interpret or constructs anything – to the contrary, is one in which one in fact suspends one’s constructive attitude and takes on a contemplative attitude, one in which the world can reveal itself beyond one’s presuppositions and expectations.

Then you go on saying, Mike (30 June), that I “don’t have inbuilt capacity for objective knowledge, independent of [my] experience interacting with the world of vehicles”. I agree, but I never claimed that I have. The inbuilt capacity for objective knowledge is a potential capacity that must be actualized by the interaction with the world. You say: “Subject and object are all entirely intertwined within our knowledge and I think it folly to try to ever completely extricate one from the other”. Again I agree. Objectivity is not the quality of the knowledge in which subject and object are completely extricated one from the other, but is the quality that knowledge tends to possess to the extent that it is the product of the transcendental subject – i.e., the one who is capable of suspending all schemes or, in your terms, of being open to new experience. I am happy that we agree in making an essential distinction between negotiation and true dialogue (and I would add between manipulation and genuine experience at the individual, pre-dialogic level). Your final remark is that “The key (perhaps illusory) distinction here seems to be between holding one’s convictions at a critically reflective distance and being willing to let them be challenged, vs. “suspension” of them.” To me suspending one’s convictions surely entails holding one’s convictions at a critically reflective distance and being willing to let them be challenged – so far we agree – but beyond this it implies the switch to a different mode of experience, i.e. passive-contemplative vs. active-constructive. Again, I do not mean to say that the one is superior to the other (that phenomenology is superior to hermeneutics): I only say that both attitudes are necessary, and should be dialectically integrated.

Finally, Mike, I agree that you and I focus on common processes, whereas Dan doesn’t.

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Dan, commenting my statement “These are not eternal truths, just essential truths inasmuch as they belong to the essence of the human species in the current phase of its evolution” you ask: “Why not just say that these are pragmatically derived truths based upon past experience”? My answer is that our search for truth is not only and not necessarily pragmatically based. The transcendental subject loves the truth for the sake of truth, independently of any pragmatic interest – and it is this at least relative independence from pragmatic interests that permits at least a relative objectivity.

To my statement “I rely mainly on processes of abstraction and identification of the inner logic of the different patterns. It is the same process applied in zoology or botany: you don't need many horses to describe the structure of the horse. Just a couple of exemplars will do” you comment “However, there are other situations in biology that strongly emphasize induction. For example, there are over 1 million species of insects, e.g., approximately 5,000 dragonfly species, 2,000 praying mantis, etc”. I agree. The point is to me that in the current phase or research we are still to describe the main categories of our field, i.e. the equivalent of classes (insects, reptiles, mammals, etc) and families (dragonflies, vipers, apes, etc). It is premature, in my view, to try to describe species and subspecies before classes and families.

Then you quote, Dan, from the very interesting paper by Stiles: “I hold an experiential correspondence theory of truth: a statement is true for you to the extent that your experience of the statement corresponds to your experience of the event (object, state of affairs) that it describes. Your experience is the common denominator.” I appreciate your quotation because it seems to show that you have overcome your previous rejection of the correspondence theory of truth. Of course “experience is the common denominator”: all we know is phenomena, that is the things as they appear to our consciousness, in other words the objects of our experience, not the things-in-themselves. In Stiles’ view, intersubjective agreement is not the final word (as it is in radical constructionism): observation is the key that connects intersubjective agreement to the real world. Observation is an independent variable: it is not the product of intersubjective negotiation, rather it is one of the ways the transcendental subject relates to the world. Objective observation happens to the extent that the subject stands on the transcendental ground, i.e. is free from pragmatic, private, cultural, theoretical, ideological, idiosyncratic interests.

Dan, 1 July 2007

(in response to Tullio, 1 July 2007)

I agree that observation is a very important way of “bumping up against the external world” and receiving input to help in confirming or modifying one’s views and the views of groups. However, I am skeptical about the possibility of a “transcendental subject” who can stand on transcendental ground, i.e. is free from pragmatic, private, cultural, theoretical, ideological, idiosyncratic interests. In philosophical pragmatism, the

basic ontology is that the foundation of the reality studied by psychology is dynamic, engaged, historically contextualized, phenomenologically-embedded practical activity that to the completely open observer is a flux and flow that cannot be absolutely stopped and cannot be focused in on to derive a representational picture of what this activity “really” is. Rather, the only way to focus the blur is through some sort of conceptual lens,
and this lens does this in part by selectively – i.e., reductively – focusing on certain aspects of the flow and flux, and not on others. With this in mind, I would like to follow up with you for concrete examples of the “transcendental subject” in action, including concrete criteria for deciding when a subject is in a transcendental as opposed to a non-transcendental state of mind.

On final note: In line with the hermeneutic paradigm, I believe there is no way to step out of our preconceptions to see the world “as it really is,” for it is always seen through particular interpretive lenses. However, via the discipline of the hermeneutic circle, it is possible to revise one’s views based on consensually agreed upon, experience-and-observation-based evidence, both of the qualitative and quantitative type.

Mike, 1 July, 2007

(in response to Tullio)

I do think we are making progress here. It seems like Tullio and I understand the dialectics of how knowledge develops in very similar ways. However what Tullio views as the “suspension of the constructive attitude”, I view as the demonstration of the human capacity for construction (or co-construction) – the capacity to create syntheses that transcend and integrate theses and antitheses – at its finest moments. I look forward to getting to the core of what this difference is all about (or Dan, in pragmatic terms, “what is at stake in this difference?”)

For example, Tullio writes today,

In a dialectical perspective the ordinary subject automatically tries to assimilate all new experiences to their old schemes (the ordinary subject basically works in an automatic, i.e. unaware and uncritical way). But then the ordinary subject (i.e., the subject that works basically in an assimilative way) comes across experiences that don’t fit well within their schemes (this is the antithetical moment). When this happens – and it happens all the time – two alternative lines are possible. On the first one, the subject succeeds in forcing the new data into the old schemes. It is what you call the “dogmatic” subject. In this case the dialectical movement of knowledge does not take place. On the second line, the transcendental subject wakes up, suspends the action of the old schemes and permits a fresh look at the world of experience, unconditioned by the old perceptive habits. In this case the dialectical movement of knowledge takes place, and leads to a new perception of things that accommodates the new experience. The new perception is a synthesis of the old and the new.

In contrast/response, I say,

Very interesting! In my model of the dialectics of development, the second path includes (as the third step, after encounter with the antithesis) attention to the conflict – the ability to hold the former schemes and the new data in attention simultaneously. (This is how I describe what you call “the transcendental subject waking up”). Perhaps we are using complementary languages for naming this key moment in the development of knowledge. My language seems more psychological; yours seems like a philosophical abstraction from these common psychological processes. ) In any case, this attention to conflict, or simultaneous attention to thesis and antithesis, creates the conditions under which what John Dewey called “deliberation” occurs in the individual; or what Habermas calls “discourse” occurs within a community/relationship. When successful, these processes of attention lead to synthesis, which is itself a constructive process (would you agree, Tullio?)

(in response to Dan)

I find myself pretty much in agreement with the ontological assumptions that Dan articulated. And it leads me to wonder whether we all agree on ontology and are all struggling to find an epistemology that synthesizes this ontology with the value we each place on the human quest for knowledge as embodying a desire for (and a presumption of the possibility of) transcending bias, narrow-mindedness, closedness to experience and to the "other" and dogmatism. Or is our disagreement an ontological one, and if so, how might such a disagreement be addressed? By trying to discover how our differing perspectives are manifest in practice?

Dan, 2 July 2007

Mike raises an excellent question: How might such a disagreement be addressed? By trying to discover how our differing perspectives are manifest in practice? This is my preference: let's see how our philosophical differences impact on how we would conduct research, how we would conduct practice, and how we would relate the two.

Tullio, 2 July 2007

I am very much in agreement with Dan’s response to Mike’s question, and guess that Mike is too. So this pre-conference discussion ends with an accurate definition of our differences, and an important agreement on how to tackle them.